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Introduction
Scholars in political science and international relations have long deployed concepts such as 'regional security complex' i (Buzan and Weaver 2003) In the past decade, the study of conflict and its resolution, especially in cases of community-based, localized, even intimate violence characteristic of civil wars, have turned from the macro, international and state level to the micro-level, producing valuable insights into local drivers, grassroots participation, and the alliances between micro and macro actors (see e.g. Kalyvas 2003 Kalyvas & 2006 . Similarly, we have witnessed a 'local turn' in the study of both transitional justice and peace building (see Waldorf and Shaw; Autesserre 2012 Autesserre & 2010 on the latter). This shift of perspective has proven immensely valuable and has certainly not eschewed critique of simplistic notions of local ownership, traditionality or hybridity. In this paper, however, I go against the grain of studying 'smaller rather than larger' and redirect our attention to the importance of studying dimensions of memory that reach across borders but are simultaneously contained within a defined area of networked space. I look at shared iv imaginary and grievance 'located' in this manner and the way in which it impacts on conflict transformation and peace-building prospects-a vector thus far eschewed in scholarly analysis and with import beyond academia. If memory at regional level is indeed an active ingredient 1 in conflict dynamics (deployed by actors to either fuel or diffuse conflict)-whether in form of cross-border fractures and grievance, or conversely 'itinerant nationalisms,' ideologies and narratives of social cohesion-this creates tensions and important questions vis-à-vis conflict resolution. In what follows, I argue and demonstrate that even in complex conflicts spanning borders, conflict resolution approaches remain fundamentally focused on events and grievances that occurred within a given nation-state and are unequipped to deal with regional dimensions of memory, which nonetheless, I argue, exert powerful impact on prospects for peace.
The paper sets its investigation in the context of arguably one of the most complex and geographically layered conflicts of recent decades. As such, the Great Lakes
Region is a key case study, pushing us to think in more imaginative and complex ways about memory. The violent crises in the Great Lakes have been cyclical and interconnected. Rwanda and Burundi have been characterized by bouts of ethnic 1 This is not to mean that memory is an independent agent and exerting autonomous force. Memory is socially constructed. What the paper argues is simply that memory, when in the hands of key actors who indeed have the power to shape it, is a key ingredient in conflict dynamics, both in the ways in which it can fuel grievance, and in attempts at diffusion of conflict.
violence ever since independence that culminated in the 1994 Rwandan genocide and spilled across the borders via vast refugee flows. The genocide in turn acted as a catalyst of one of the most complex wars on the African continent. The violent confrontations that took place on the territory of the DRC between 1997 and 2003, and the violence that lingers to this day, have involved no less than eight neighboring
African nations and a multiplicity of local armed groups (Prunier 2009 , Lemarchand 2009 , Verhoeven and Roessler 2016 . But the conflict in Central Africa is not only very much regionally constituted in terms of actual geographical spread, it is also where regional history and collective memories are deployed and contested, they become protagonists to conflict itself and continue to be axes of dispute and tension in so-called 'post-conflict' commemoration and peace-building practice as well.
While the centrality of historical memory-particularly the uses and abuses of stories of origin-have been acknowledged through seminal works such as those of Jan Vansina (2004) on Rwanda and René Lemarchand (1996) on Burundi, few scholars have attempted to glance the problematique through squarely regional lens and have instead studied what they called political 'myths' (Lemarchand 1999) , the uses of stories of origin to political ends and at times violent attempts at exclusionary nationbuilding within particular national contexts. Mahmood Mamdani (2002) remains one of the few scholars who has intimated a more regional constitution of conflictcontributing memory in the Great Lakes in his essay 'African States, Citizenship and War,' Mamdani shows how a particular, exclusionary form of citizenship, a legacy of colonialism, has been replicated across Uganda, Rwanda and the DRC, producing a cycle of displacement, conflict and challenges to peace building. A particular form of non-democratic citizenship is indeed still being reproduced across the region and fuels conflict and constraints nation-building in its aftermath. Importantly, memory shared across borders mediates this dynamic. Thus our limits on imagining memory in its regional dimensions acts to hinder our attempts at conflict transformation as well.
But memory at regional level is not only about social fracture as more commonly understood, it can also refer to the transnational dimensions of nationalism. Hence we must seriously investigate the degree to which memories spanning borders have the potential to be both conflict producing and conflict diffusing. Scholars have begun exploring nationalist groups and movements based across borders and inspired through their exilic experience. Scholarship on national liberation movements in southern Africa has begun to explore the fundamentally 'transnational' operation of 'nationalist' movements, which were firmly embedded in the region and mobile across borders (see Hayes 2014 , MacMillan 2013 , Terretta 2010 , White and Larmer 2014 ). This has certainly been the case for the second wave of liberation movements as well, as the case of the Rwanda Patriotic Front shows.
Most recently, Larmer and Kennes (2016) have traced the fascinating history of the Katangese gendarmes, the short-lived army of a self-declared Katanga state in the southern reaches of the Congo (today DRC) whose members have dispersed across the region after the secession failed, having been mobilized and demobilized in regional conflicts, incursions into the Congo, and later the integrated DRC army. The authors argue that it was a common project of imagining a homeland, resuscitating memories of secession that provided an identity over time to ex-militaries spread beyond the borders of the DRC. Understanding this group 'necessitates a dynamic, mobile historical analysis, following the gendarmes across borders ' (2016:2) .
Similarly, the RPF nationalism studied here was born in exile, across a number of countries in the region, and later 'repatriated' home through a military invasion and capture of power.
The present paper contributes to and extends these debates by exploring the nexus between memory and conflict, the actual mechanisms through which memory in its regional dimension impinges on post-war social cohesion and the prospects for durable peace. In this respect, the paper shows that complex conflicts spin diverse 'regimes of memory'-different ways in which memory impacts conflict. Regionbased memory can be used to fuel conflict or, as will be shown, it can be deployed in nation-building, seemingly opposed projects as far as social cohesion is concerned. I call these two regimes 'contestatory' and 'consolidatory' -the former referring to what unravels society (memories fuelling continued grievances), the latter to what is meant to restore social cohesion (memory deployed in nation-building). The distinct contribution of this paper is its focus on the little-studied mobile diasporic memorymemory born in regional exile transplanted 'home' to nation-build-and on analyzing the two contrasting regimes of memory alongside each other with the following core question in mind: What is the relationship between regional strands of memory and social cohesion, and can our very 'imagining regionally' help us better tailor our conflict transformation initiatives?
This duality of region-based memory-that it has defined and been defined by social fracture, and it has also been deployed, perhaps paradoxically, in post-conflict attempts at nation building-derives from the productive ambiguity that lies at the root of the concept. Are region-wide memories the shared meanings/representations across the span of a region? Or can they even exist in one locality upon which people from across a region coalesce and where they deploy their diasporic recollections to a common purpose, or say where, without moving, people deploy regionally constructed frameworks of analysis of their national predicaments? In this paper, I
explore both aspects since I don't take the physical location as primary to our definition but rather the community of experience, whether real or imagined. The paper thus analyses memory both as the shared networks of meaning across national boundaries and the ways in which people who were dispersed across a region come together to, paradoxically, craft a nationalist memory by deploying a distinctly regional one. This latter aspect builds on my long-term research on the politics of nation building in Rwanda.
The above has implications vis-à-vis the broader conception of a region. There are different ways to conceptualize it. One way to proceed is through a pre-definition of region as a collection of contiguous territorial units, whether nation-states, municipalities or groups of people. But this approach is unwieldy as it might not encompass the phenomenon at hand. The second option is to define regions more organically and dynamically as networks of interaction, whether exchange, action, influence or impact. In this second conception, regions are not pre-defined geographically but geographies self-define through the events and interactions that tie areas together. This opens up all sorts of interesting ways to think of region-based memory and its 'mobility.' In this conception, both region and memory become expandable, and they can also be carried -as in literally where the regional diaspora returns home and deploys memory and memory building in their post-war reconstruction. The case of Rwanda demonstrates this most clearly. The refugee communities produced through violence rooted in divisive memory traded across borders consolidated an ostensibly alternative, 'unifying' nationalism, and repatriated it home.
A key, overarching concern of the paper is of course to consider whether these two regional 
Memory Regimes
In which ways do conflict and memory intersect on a regional level? The intricacies of a concrete case demonstrate at least three ways in which this happens: First, the regional circulation of divisive historical narratives can directly contribute to violence. Second, a reductive framing of national crises against dynamics elsewhere in the region can contribute to polarization of communities and escalation of domestic crises. Finally, the formation of diasporic memory resulting from conflict-induced migrations can results in new nationalist visions and alternative historical narratives that aim to be inclusive, to unify rather than divide.
Importantly, it is not simply the violent conflict itself that spins memory across a region but its very roots lie in region-based memory. Specifically, the underlying cause is the exclusionary nature of citizenship rooted in ethnonationalist imaginings of belonging, traceable to colonial racist representations and practices in the region, including in Burundi, Rwanda and the DRC, all of which were under Belgian colonial rule. Though colonial rule is more often remembered for creating 'artificial' borders and importing the nation-state form, it is colonial rule that in fact first laid the groundwork for regionalization of memory. Ready-made racialized interpretive grids imported by the colonialists were adapted to local circumstances and became ultimately instrumentalized from below. They entered a local repertoire of myths (Lemarchand 1999 , Jackson 2006 and offered a way of interpreting local dynamics in much broader terms.
The so-called 'Hamitic hypothesis' lies at the core of such regionalism. The colonialists racialized social differences and vested racial supremacy and power in the hands of one group, incidentally the minority in both Burundi and Rwanda-the Tutsi.
The predominantly pastoralist Tutsi were considered superior as so-called Hamites, allegedly a branch of the Caucasian race (see Taylor Besides toxic regional narratives of origin and belonging, a related regional dynamic was at play and namely the framing of the political situation at home against situations elsewhere in the region. Such 'vicarious remembrance' involved the reading one's own predicament through past and present (violent) events across the border. For most of their post-colonial history, Burundi and Rwanda were seemingly symmetrical opposites of each other-while Rwanda was dominated by the majority Hutu (first southern Hutu, then northern Hutu), Burundi was ruled by the minority Tutsi (specifically the Banyabururi elites). The two countries were not of course exact inversions of each other, with Burundi's social diversity more complex and less ethnicised at independence (Lemarchand 1996) , but what matters is that people read history across the border as inspiration and omen of what could come. As a result of this framing, the events in Rwanda, especially the Hutu seizure of power in the 1959 'social revolution' both inspired the masses in Burundi and confirmed the worst fears of the Burundian elite. This 'mirror image dynamics' continued and created a unique form of regionalization of national crises.
In effect, through vicarious remembrance Burundi's political elites took a 'false definition' of the social problem upon themselves -reading their own predicament in line with Rwanda, whose social composition was similar and yet not identical and less complex. 3 Nonetheless, as Lemarchand (1996) In sum, waves of migration out of partial, exclusionary nationalisms have come to constitute a region-wide conflict and region-wide memory. The conflict cycle hasn't been broken to this day and, as I will show, memory is implicated. I will attempt to do this in two ways, by asking: First, has the regional nature of contested narratives been acknowledged? And second, has a new regionally sourced nationalism produced a more inclusionary form of citizenship? In answering these questions, I will zoom in on the legacies of the Rwandan genocide. I will first look at the way in which the genocide and its outfall created a contested memory beyond the borders of that single nation-state, why this matters and whether this has been acknowledged post-conflict.
Second, I will look at how regional diasporic memory has been deployed by the returning diaspora in Rwanda for the purposes of nation building and reconciliation after the genocide.
A Memory Regime of Contestation: Conflicted Memories and Silenced Memory in the Region
First, let us explore memory as a regime of region-wide contestation. The 1994
Rwandan genocide, the civil war that led to it and the regional war that was spawned as its result, have created a fractured memory regime, layers of region-wide memory The suppressed memory and counter-memory of course have layers. There are those who do not deny the genocide but highlight crimes that were committed alongside it.
There also more extreme narratives still circulating across the region, some denying/negating genocide (guhakana) and others diminishing/trivializing (gupfobya) the crime of genocide. These latter narratives add fuel to the Rwandan government's political repression, offering a ready-made frame for attacking all those who oppose the political establishment rather than simply those who threaten the safety of the population. Abahakana -the deniers of genocide, and the abakwirakwiza -those who spread genocide ideology, have become potent political labels. But 'genocide ideology' (ingengabitekerezo ya jenoside) is not only a key domestic concern-cumtool of the government, it has 'spread' (Rusagara 2012) But the fascinating story of a 'regionally-constituted nationalism' does not end here.
Rwanda's repatriated nation building has later been again re-exported to the region. Kagame took the floor. 'Your problem is that you don't love your country. You need to suffer; you are living the good life. When we were in our rebellion, we were so poor that we didn't have plates to eat out of'' (quoted in Stearns 2011).
What type of nation-building is being created through civic education in camps such as ingando? Does it live up to its promise of countering the divisive ethnonationalisms that took root in the region in the past? Research in Rwanda suggests that regional experience does not necessarily translate into a more civic and inclusive notion of a nation (Purdeková 2008) , one that would be inspired in the complex migration histories and identities and a hybrid sense of belonging. Instead, the accent is on restoring the glorious pre-colonial past, to resurrect 'Rwandanicity' as a cultural ideal, and to underscore loyalty and non-veering from the official line. The dominant nationalist narrative eschews diversity in the name of building common
Rwandanness, but its strong emphasis on 'unity' merely papers over divisions that linger under the surface, the authoritarian nature of the government and its narrow base. The nation building project also interlaces with regime building: Regional historical memory is renarrated to serve a very politicized form of nation building, and the government crafts a type of citizenship that emphasizes loyalty to the state and the governing party (see Purdeková 2015) . 
Conclusions
By way of conclusion, let me return to the core question of the paper: Is it useful to imagine memory, and not only conflict, regionally? The answer must be in the affirmative. Paying attention to imaginaries (whether grievances, differences or communality) shared within a bounded area but one that crosses national borders, is analytically productive in a number of ways at once. The post-colonial conflict in the Great Lakes of Africa set the ground for contested memory but also for diasporic imaginary after the capture of power. Regionally applied imaginaries of belonging and exclusion have fostered violence and strewn people across borders. Such conflicted past has in turn produced both fractures and festering silences, and new imaginaries of belonging and nationness re-exported across boundaries. Such memory has thus fuelled both lingering social divisions and itinerant nationalisms. To take this duality into account, we can speak of different 'regimes' of region-wide memory in operation-such memory can aid state-making and nation-building, and it can be fundamentally fragmentary, undermining these projects because of the ongoing conflicts and the lack of full reconciliation on the past.
As shown on the case of Rwanda, the same actors can in fact participate in both regimes. At the same time as the PRF actively pursues a regionally-sourced nationbuilding seeped in its guerilla history of a truly transnational diasporic struggle, it also contributes to continued insecurity beyond its borders, which further polarizes communities across the region, producing a regional fracture. In the final reading, however, these two regimes are hardly opposed. The social cohesion being built in Rwanda through the elite's nation-building attempts reproduces a dominant, top-down vision of unity that silences aspects of the past, reproduces partial victimhood and fosters sense of injustice as a result-social fracture by any other name. Hence though the two regimes are indeed distinct, their outcomes vis-à-vis peace-building might not be always dissimilar.
There isn't just one way to breach the topic of regional memory as there isn't just one strand of memory to explore in any given geographical region. Here, I have shown on the specific example of Rwanda how both the victims of genocide and the killings of the RPF reach beyond the borders of this country. In this case, the study of the two memory regimes unveils a paradox. Perhaps counter-intuitively, paying attention to layers of contestation can remind us that much more work is still necessary when it comes to peace building. It points us in the right direction and underlines our need to expand our understanding and action in line with this more expansive notion of memory. At the same time, and despite its appeals to nation-building, a restorative history, and multiplicity of activities of transitional justice, a consolidatory regime such as that in Rwanda -a new, regionally-sourced nationalist memory appealing to unity and setting itself in opposition to divisive ethnic narratives-might merely obscure the social fractures, local, national and regional in scope, that still persist.
Importantly, the usefulness of 'imagining regionally' when it comes to memory extends beyond the realm of analysis. It does not only refine our understanding of memory and conflict, it also informs the practice of conflict resolution where it can expand the available repertoire of action. The paper highlighted the tension between the phenomenon under study -regional in scope-and the way in which it is acted upon. Peace-building and transitional justice cannot be fully successful if regional fractures such as partial victimhood and silenced violence are not recognized and acted upon as such. Peace-building and transitional justice attempts cannot be comprehensive if regional memory is fractured through different, and sometimes competing, national attempts to deal with its legacy and continued impact (i.e.
integrationism and de-ethnicisation in Rwanda versus power-sharing and entrenchment of ethnicity in Burundi). As argued in the paper, and with relevance to other regional war complexes around the world, a regional frame does not equal the summation of national actors, at whatever level, whether grassroots or state house.
What does this imply in terms of practice? Practically speaking, a dedicated, independent body such as a commission of regional memory could be established to create a space necessary to supersede nationalist narratives of memory and memory initiatives bound by national boundaries. For example, rather than speaking of a Rwandan genocide as an event confined to the national territory of Rwanda, a regional memory body would re-narrate it as a phenomenon whose roots, extent and impact are regional.
The role of the new regional memory architecture would be to explore and document regional extensions of memory, to suggest forms of resolution spanning borders, and to organize activities towards these ends. It would involve the establishment of regional archives and regional commemoration, amongst other things. This work would create two important contributions of both epistemic and practical value. First, such frame would finally give voice and recognition to migrants and refugees and place their experience more firmly at the center of historical events; it would underscore their predicaments as in need of recognition and redress. Second, such frame would be more firmly decolonial, and open opportunities for decolonial debates and action. If colonialism was key to laying the groundwork for some of the toxic narratives spanning the region, then only a truly regional frame is fit to address and redress this aspect of the past, and explore its legacies and continuities in the present.
In sum then, the framework of regional memory has much to offer, and the present paper is merely a small first step towards exploring its full potential.
